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Abstract—This work tackles the problem of fuzzy joining
of strings that naturally tokenize into meaningful substrings,
e.g., full names. Tokenized-string joins have several established
applications in the context of data integration and cleaning. This
work is primarily motivated by fraud detection, where attackers
slightly modify tokenized strings, e.g., names on accounts, to
create numerous identities that she can use to defraud service
providers, e.g., Google, and LinkedIn.
To detect such attacks, all the accounts are pair-wise compared,
and the resulting similar accounts are considered suspicious and
are further investigated. Comparing the tokenized-string features
of a large number of accounts requires an intuitive tokenized-
string distance that can detect subtle edits introduced by an
adversary, and a very scalable algorithm. This is not achievable
by existing distance measure that are unintuitive, hard to tune,
and whose join algorithms are serial and hence unscalable.
We define a novel intuitive distance measure between tokenized
strings, Normalized Setwise Levenshtein Distance (NSLD). To the
best of our knowledge, NSLD is the first metric proposed for
comparing tokenized strings. We propose a scalable distributed
framework, Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ), that adopts existing
scalable string-join algorithms as building blocks to perform
NSLD-joins. We carefully engineer optimizations and approx-
imations that dramatically improve the efficiency of TSJ. The
effectiveness of the TSJ framework is evident from the evaluation
conducted on tens of millions of tokenized-string names from
Google accounts. The superiority of the tokenized-string-specific
TSJ framework over the general-purpose metric-spaces joining
algorithms has been established.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, a large number of Internet services are provided
to the public, including web-search (e.g., Google Search),
online maps (e.g., Google Maps), online product reviews (e.g.,
Amazon Customer Reviews), online social and professional
networks (e.g., Facebook and LinkedIn), video streaming
(e.g., YouTube), and sharing rides and residences (e.g., Uber
and Airbnb). The high cost of designing, deploying, and
maintaining these services is covered by commissions from
Internet advertising (e.g., Google, YouTube and Facebook),
commissions from e-commerce transactions (e.g., Amazon),
members’ subscriptions (e.g., LinkedIn), or claiming a share
in the sharing economy (e.g., Uber and Airbnb).
For these providers to thrive, it is crucial for them to
guarantee high standards on the quality of the offered services.
Part of this work was done while the first author was with Google Inc. The
authors like to thank Theodore Hwa of LinkedIn for his insightful discussions
and revising the theoretical foundations.
Google, YouTube and Facebook need to protect the Return-
On-Investment of their advertisers by ensuring the ads are
viewed and clicked by real surfers, which respectively reflect
real exposure to the market and genuine interest in the ad-
vertised products. To maintain the credibility of its product
reviews, Amazon should show only reviews from real buyers
on the listed products. LinkedIn should ensure the profiles
targeted by the recruiters represent real professionals. Uber and
Airbnb should ensure ride and residence sharing jeopardizes
neither the safety of the hosts nor the guests.
For these providers to guarantee high-quality services, it is
of utmost importance to foster an environment of trust with
their users. This entails identifying ill-intentioned users and
fraudsters who disguise as legitimate users. Failure to identify
abusive users may hurt the company’s image and opportunities
[29], [63]. A significant body of recent research has focused
on identifying abusive users. Malicious applications on social
networks were studied in [49]. Classifying social networks’
accounts based on the novelty of their content was proposed
in [65]. The analysis of the edges in the social network graphs
was used for detecting fake accounts [6], [65], [72], and for
mitigating bought online reviews [34]. Limiting the sign-up
of fake accounts was studied in [62]. Detection of account
takeover and cloning that are then used by the attackers in
malicious activities was studied in [5], [20], [21], [32]. Other
research focused on identifying the activity/traffic generated
by abusive users. Filtering abusive ads traffic was studied in
[15], [16], [41], [44], [46], [58], and fake likes and promotion
on social networks was studied in [17], [28].
Targeting the aforementioned silo attacks and their traffic
is a first line defense in the arms race between the service
providers and the abusers. However, in the online world,
an abuser can have numerous identities1. Hence, silo-attack
defenses do not safeguard against attacks that are carried out
by attackers controlling numerous identities [2], [43]. These
identities may not necessarily be active at the same time. These
multi-identity attacks can be classified roughly into serial and
parallel attacks, or combinations of both2.
A serial attacker is one who abuses the service provider
using a new account every time her old account is terminated.
1We will use “Identity” and “account” synonymously.
2In reputation systems, similar notions to those of serial and parallel attacks
are known as Whitewashing and Sybil attacks, respectively [27], [74].
These attackers gain experience with every account termina-
tion, and work on reverse-engineering the silo-attack defenses.
A parallel attacker, on the other hand, is one who controls
numerous accounts with the service providers that are active
at the same time. The goal is to launch a sophisticated attack
that causes significant damage by driving little abuse from
each account, such that each individual account stays under
the radar level of the silo-attack defenses. Examples of the
malicious or criminal activity conducted using rings of fake
or hijacked accounts include click fraud [3], [54], content
scraping [23], [55], posting fake reviews [14], [33], fake video
views [57], and even fake academic paper reviews [50].
Seminal research on multi-identity attacks was conducted in
context of click fraud [42], and email spam [75]. The work in
[7], [45], [59], [66], [68] clusters the accounts to detect rings
of abusive accounts. The recent work in [47], [70] extended
this clustering approach using multiple signals simultaneously.
The underground market at which abusers buy fake accounts
in the thousands was studied in [60].
A. The Motivating Application
This work is motivated by detecting advertising fraud rings.
The online ad industry generated $88 billion in 2017 in
the U.S. alone [4]. In online advertising, an online-content
publisher registers its web sites with the network operator,
e.g., Google, to display ads on her sites. A publisher receives
revenue to a payment instrument, e.g., bank account, for
actions on the displayed ads, e.g., views or clicks by surfers.
Sophisticated fraudsters typically sign up for numerous
accounts to spread their revenue and circumvent the silo-
attack defenses, which is against the policy of most reputable
networks [24]. This motivates clustering publisher accounts
for discovering potential click fraud rings [7], [42], [45], [68].
Each publisher account has meta-data, i.e., account attributes.
For each account attribute, all the accounts are compared pair-
wise. The pairs of accounts that are highly similar are used to
form edges in a similarity graph for that attribute, where the
graph nodes represent accounts. The graph is clustered. The
detected clusters flag potential rings.
Some of these attributes are difficult to fake, and are hence
excellent candidates for account clustering. One example is
the name on the bank account to which the ad-traffic revenue
is deposited. Currently, most banks around the world would,
if a drastic mismatch is detected in the beneficiary name, not
automatically credit the money to the account until manually
checked by a bank officer. Providing a fake name to Google
would result in the bank rejecting the transfer of the ad-traffic
revenue from Google to the attacker’s bank account, which
defeats the purpose of the attack.
Opening bank accounts incur overhead for fraudsters [40].
Hence, they do not control an infinite number of bank ac-
count holders, and strive to maximize their utilization of the
resources they control. A Fraudster would try to use the same
resource multiple times by slightly altering its form.
For instance, a bank account holder whose name is “Barak
Obama” can open multiple bank accounts, and multiple ac-
counts with a service provider under the slightly-edited names
“Obamma, Boraak H.” or “Burak Ubama”. When receiving
funds to the right bank account number but to a slightly-edited
name, the bank officers would not be alarmed. However, these
minor well-crafted edits would circumvent the multi-identify
attack defenses of the service provider. If the attack defenses
employ naı¨ve tokenized-string comparison techniques, they
would not identify these accounts with the service provider
as a fraud ring since they have different bank account names.
The bank account holder signal, among other string signals,
warrant devising a very scalable technique for comparing
tokenized strings in a fuzzy way. Other abuse-detection appli-
cations that benefit from string-comparison include detecting
paid reviews, detecting fake comments and harassing mes-
sages on social networks, and detecting fake job descriptions
on professional networks. Moreover, several well-established
applications of data integration and cleaning can benefit
from comparing tokenizable strings. Such applications include
record joining and deduplication in data warehouses, and
comparison shopping search engines [22].
As reviewed in Sec. IV, existing tokenized-string compar-
ison algorithms are serial, and hence cannot scale to self-
joining tens of millions of records. These algorithms employ
distance measures that are sensitive to the order of the tokens
(FMS [10]), asymmetric (FMS and AFMS [10]), or are hard to
tune since they require setting multiple independent thresholds
(all the measures surveyed and proposed in [13], [67]).
B. Our Contributions
Our main contribution can be summarized as follows.
1) In Sec. II, we formulate the problems of fuzzy joins
of tokenized strings. Specifically, we define transfor-
mations that capture modifications to tokenized strings.
We leverage these transformations to define a novel
distance between tokenized strings, Normalized Setwise
Levenshtein Distance (NSLD). NSLD is an intuitive
metric that is general enough to be applicable to abuse-
detection applications as well as the well-established
applications of data integration and cleaning. We prove
NSLD is a metric, and hence can be leveraged in all
flavors of K-nearest-neighbor queries on metric spaces.
2) In Sec. III, we devise Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ), a
scalable NSLD-joining framework that adopts existing
string-join algorithms as building blocks. We carefully
engineer optimizations and approximations that trade
efficiency for recall.
3) TSJ is generalizable to several parallelizing paradigms,
such as MPI and OpenMP. We report the impressive
scalability and efficiency of MapReduce-distributed TSJ
on tens of millions of names on Google accounts in
Sec. V. We discuss the optimizations and the tradeoffs of
the approximations, and demonstrate TSJ’s superiority
over state-of-the-art generic distance-metric algorithms.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FORMULATION
The aforementioned applications revolve around tokenized
strings, i.e., strings that naturally tokenize into substrings
that are meaningful to humans, where slightly editing and
shuffling these tokens do not change the interpretation of
the string drastically. While it is challenging to mimic the
human ability to compare text, a practicable distance/similarity
measure to compare tokenized strings is devised. This measure
is a metric, and hence can be leveraged in all flavors of K-
nearest-neighbor queries on metric spaces, e.g., [12], [48],
[61]. Most importantly, it possess the properties that facilitate
devising a scalable tokenized-string-joining algorithm3.
A. Notation and Definition
A distance D(·, ·) over a set A is a function that maps a pair
of elements in A to a non-negative real number. A distance
D(·, ·) is a metric if the following holds ∀α, β, γ ∈ A .
1) Identity: D(α, α) = 0,
2) Symmetry: D(α, β) = D(β, α), and
3) Triangle Inequality: D(α, β) +D(β, γ) ≥ D(α, γ).
Let Σ be a finite alphabet and Σ∗ be a set of all finite-
length strings over Σ. Denote a string x ∈ Σ∗ as x1x2 . . . x|x|,
where |x| is the length of the string x. A substring of x is
xixi+1 . . . xj , where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ |x|. If i > j, the substring is
the empty string ǫ, where |ǫ| = 0. A string distance d(·, ·) is
a distance over Σ∗. A tokenizer t(·) is a function that maps a
string x to a finite multiset of strings xt = {xt1, xt2, . . . , xtm}.
We call xt a tokenized string of x, and we call xti a token in
xt. Denote the number of tokens in xt as T (xt) = m, and the
aggregate length of tokens of xt as L(xt) = Σi|x
ti|. A simple
and commonly used tokenizer splits a string into tokens, i.e.,
substrings, by using whitespaces as separators. A tokenized-
string distance dt(·, ·) is a distance over all tokenized strings.
Note that, given dt(·, ·) and t(·), we can form a string
distance by letting d(x, y) = dt(t(x), t(y)). Conversely, we
formulate the tokenized-string distances in terms of string
distances. Since the tokens of any tokenized string are also
strings, string distances can be used to form a tokenized-
string distance. More formally, dt(t(x), t(y)) = dt(xt, yt) =
f(d(xti, ytj)∀xti ∈ xt, ytj ∈ yt), for some function f .
B. Problem Statement
Given two sets of tokenized strings, R = {rt1, r
t
2, . . . , r
t
S}
and P = {pt1, p
t
2, . . . , p
t
Q}, a tokenized-string distance, d
t(·, ·),
and a threshold, T , the goal is to find all tokenized string pairs
〈rts, p
t
q〉, s.t. r
t
s ∈ R, p
t
q ∈ P and d
t(rts, p
t
q) ≤ T .
The problem can also be expressed in terms of similarity.
Given a conversion scheme, λ, from distance to similarity,
the goal would be to find all tokenized string pairs whose
similarity is at least λ(T ). Several such schemes are commonly
used, e.g., λ(T ) = 1−T , λ(T ) = 1/(1+T ) or λ(T ) = e−T .
3When detecting fraud rings, the joined sets are one and the same, resulting
in a self-join, i.e., a pair-wise comparisons of all the tokenized strings.
C. String Distances
1) Levenshtein Distance (LD): We borrow the Levenshtein
Distance first introduced in [35].
Definition 1: Denote 〈a → b〉 as a character-level edit
operation transforming a string a to a string b, where |a|, |b|
are 0 or 1. Three character-level edit operations are used.
1) Insertion (|a| = 0, |b| = 1)
2) Deletion (|a| = 1, |b| = 0)
3) Substitution (|a| = 1, |b| = 1)
Given two strings x, y ∈ Σ∗, LD(x, y) is the minimum
number of character-level edit operations (Insertion, Deletion
and Substitution) that transform x to y.
Lemma 1: LD(·, ·) is a metric.
LD does not consider the string length or the num-
ber of matched characters, which biases the distance to be
smaller when comparing relatively short strings. For exam-
ple, the distance LD(“Thomson”, “Thompson”) = 1, while
LD(“Alex”, “Alexa”) = 1. While both pairs have the same
LD, humans may consider the former pair more similar. This
motivates normalizing the Levenshtein Distance.
2) Normalized Levenshtein Distance (NLD): We borrow
the Normalized Levenshtein Distance proposed in [37].
Definition 2: For any pair x, y ∈ Σ∗, NLD(x, y) =
2×LD(x,y)
|x|+|y|+LD(x,y) .
For example, NLD(“Thomson”, “Thompson”) = 2×17+8+1 =
1
8 , while NLD(“Alex”, “Alexa”) =
2×1
4+5+1 =
1
5 . This moti-
vates normalization makes NLD more intuitive than LD.
Lemma 2: NLD(·, ·) ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 1: NLD(·, ·) is a metric.
The proof of Lemma 2 is trivial and that of Theorem 1 is
in [37]. We introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Assuming |y| ≥ |x|, the following relationship
holds 1− |x||y| ≤ NLD(x, y) ≤
2
|x|
|y|
+2
.
D. Tokenized-String Distances
The straightforward way to define a distance between two
tokenized strings is to use an existing similarity measure,
e.g. Ruzicka, cosine, and Dice [8], to measure the similarity
between their token multisets. This proposal is too rigid when
considering token edits. A token that belongs to two strings
will not be counted as common if it is slightly edited, leading
to biasing the distance measures. We propose tokenized-string
distances that accommodate token edits4.
1) Setwise Levenshtein Distance (SLD): We propose two
set-level edit operations, and use them, along with character-
level edit operations to devise SLD.
Definition 3: Denote 〈at → bt〉 as a set-level edit operation
transforming a tokenized string at to a tokenized string bt. Two
set-level edit operations are defined.
1) AddEmptyToken 〈at → at ∪ {ǫ}〉
2) RemoveEmptyToken 〈at → at \ {ǫ}〉
Given two tokenized strings xt, yt, SLD(xt, yt) is the
minimum number of character-level edit operations (Insertion,
4Other non-metric distances [10], [13], [67] are reviewed in Sec. IV.
Deletion and Substitution) performed on tokens with addition-
ally any number of set-level edit operations (AddEmptyToken
and RemoveEmptyToken) that transform xt to yt.
For example, if xt = {“chan”, “kalan”}, yt = {“chank”,
“alan”}, and zt = {“alan”}. SLD(xt, yt) = 2 by editing
“chan” to “chank” and “kalan” to “alan”. SLD(xt, zt) = 5
by editing “kalan” to “alan”, “chan” to ǫ, and removing the ǫ.
Lemma 4: SLD(·, ·) is a metric.
2) Normalized Setwise Levenshtein Distance (NSLD):
NSLD can be defined in terms of SLD as follows.
Definition 4: Given two tokenized strings xt, yt,
NSLD(xt, yt) = 2×SLD(x
t,yt)
L(xt)+L(yt)+SLD(xt,yt) .
For example, if xt = {“chan”, “kalan”} and yt = {“chank”,
“alan”}. NSLD(xt, yt) = 2×29+9+2 = 0.2. This motivates
normalization makes NSLD more intuitive than SLD.
Lemma 5: NSLD(·, ·) ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 6: Assuming L(yt) ≥ L(xt), the following rela-
tionship holds 1− L(x
t)
L(yt) ≤ NSLD(x
t, yt) ≤ 2
L(xt)
L(yt)
+2
.
Theorem 2: NSLD(·, ·) is a metric.
By proving NSLD is a metric, it can be leveraged in all
flavors of K-nearest-neighbor queries on metric spaces, e.g.,
[12], [48], [61]. Moreover, the existing algorithms for dis-
tributed joining on general metric spaces, e.g., [39], [53], [56],
[68], can be leveraged for performing NSLD-joins. However,
these techniques are not optimized for (tokenized) strings. This
motivates developing a specialized framework, Tokenized-
String Joiner (TSJ). TSJ leverages existing distributed LD-
joining algorithms as building blocks, as discussed in Sec. III.
III. JOINING TOKENIZED STRINGS
The Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ) follows a generate-filter-
verify paradigm for NSLD-joins of tokenized strings. This
section discusses how to develop TSJ using MapReduce.
A. The MapReduce Framework
MapReduce [18] has become the de facto framework for
scalable data processing in shared-nothing clusters, since it
offers high scalability and built-in fault tolerance. The compu-
tation is expressed in terms of two functions, map and reduce.
map : 〈key1, value1〉 → [〈key2, value2〉]
reduce : 〈key2, [value2]〉 → [value3]
Each record in the input dataset is represented as a tuple
〈key1, value1〉. The input dataset is distributed among the
mappers that execute the map functionality. Each mapper
applies the map function on each input record to produce a list
on the form [〈key2, value2〉], where [.] represents a list. Then,
the shufflers group the output of the mappers by the key. Next,
each reducer is fed a tuple on the form 〈key2, [value2]〉, where
[value2], the reduce value list, contains all the value2’s that
were output by any mapper with the same key2 value. Each
reducer applies the reduce function on the 〈key2, [value2]〉
tuple to produce a list, [value3].
B. The Generate-Filter-Verify Paradigm
TSJ follows a generate-filter-verify paradigm for high effi-
ciency. It first generates candidate pairs of tokenized strings.
Every generated pair either shares at least one token, or has
at least a pair of tokens that are highly similar.
Then, TSJ applies low-cost filters to exclude candidate
pairs without loss of correctness. The filters reduce the large
number of tokenized string comparisons, and are applied at
both the token-level and at the tokenized-string-level. Finally,
TSJ calculates the NSLD of the remaining candidate pairs for
verification. All the stages are parallelized using MapReduce.
C. Generating Shared-Token Candidate Pairs
To generate all pairs of tokenized strings that share at least
one token, each tokenized string in R and P is output with
all its tokens. Then, the tokenized strings sharing a token
are grouped together for further verification. For efficiency,
identifiers of the tokenized strings and the tokens are used.
In MapReduce notation, the same map function processes
R and P strings, and is defined as rts → [〈r
ti
s , r
t
s〉] and p
t
q →
[〈ptjq , p
t
q〉]. The shufflers group by the key, resulting in each
token, z, being associated with all rts and p
t
q tokenized strings
containing z. Each reducer receives all the tokenized strings
rts and p
t
q containing a shared token, z, and generates the
corresponding list of candidates. That is, ∀rts|z ∈ r
t
s, ∀p
t
q|z ∈
ptq, the reduce function is 〈z, [r
t
s] + [p
t
q]〉 → [〈r
t
s, p
t
q〉].
D. Generating Similar-Token Candidate Pairs
TSJ also generates the candidate pairs of tokenized strings
that have at least one pair of similar tokens.
Theorem 3: Given two tokenized strings xt, yt, and a
threshold T , s.t. NSLD(xt, yt) ≤ T . There exists a pair of to-
kens 〈xti, ytj〉, xti ∈ xt, ytj ∈ yt where NLD(xti, ytj) ≤ T .
Theorem 3 captures the main insight behind the scalability
of TSJ. A pair of tokenized strings where all the possible pairs
of their tokens have NLD exceeding the threshold T cannot
be a candidate for verification. To the best of our knowledge,
NSLD is the first distance measure that guarantees two
tokenized strings whose distance is below a threshold T have
two tokens where a function of LD of the tokens is below
T . This allows for transforming the join from the tokenized-
strings domain to the tokens domain that is more manageable.
The number of distinct tokens is typically orders of magnitude
smaller than that of distinct tokenized strings.
More formally, NSLD-joins of tokenized strings can be
reduced to the problem of NLD-joins of tokens. To formal-
ize this reduction, we define the token space of a set of
tokenized strings to be the set of all the tokens of all of
the tokenized strings in the set. Given two sets of tokenized
strings, R = {rt1, r
t
2, . . . , r
t
S} and P = {p
t
1, p
t
2, . . . , p
t
Q},
define their token spaces as Rt = {rtis |r
t
s ∈ R, r
ti
s ∈ r
t
s, ∀s, i}
and P t = {ptjq |p
t
q ∈ P, p
tj
q ∈ p
t
q, ∀q, j}, respectively. The
first phase of generating NSLD-candidates for R and P is
generating NLD-candidates for Rt and P t. For every pair of
tokens, rtis ∈ R
t, ptjq ∈ P
t, such that NLD(rtis , p
tj
q ) ≤ T ,
all the tokenized strings in R and P generating rtis and p
tj
q ,
respectively, are NSLD-join candidates.
To perform the NLD-joins, TSJ employs MassJoin [19], a
MapReduce-distributed version of PassJoin [36] that was orig-
inally proposed for LD-joins. PassJoin intuition is captured in
lemma 7 that is borrowed from [36] .
Lemma 7: Given two strings x, and y, and a threshold U ,
where LD(x, y) ≤ U , partitioning y into any U +1 segments
results in at least one segment being a substring of x.
PassJoin partitions every token rtis ∈ R
t into its segments,
and generates the substrings of every token ptjq ∈ P
t. For
every matching segment and substring, their generating token
pair 〈rtis , p
tj
q 〉 is a LD-join candidate.
When generating the segments or the substrings of a token,
z, the MassJoin mapper outputs z keyed by each of its
string chunks (segments or substrings). All tokens sharing the
same string chunk are grouped together by the shufflers and
are processed by the same reducer. Each reducer outputs all
possible candidates pairs of tokens, x and y, from Rt and P t,
respectively. The candidates are de-duplicaated, and the LD-
similar pairs of tokens are produced. MassJoin augments the
mapper output key by metadata to reduce candidate pairs, and
whenever possible, uses unique ids of chunks and tokens. We
next explain how to adopt the LD-MassJoin for NLD-joins.
Lemma 8: Given two strings x, and y, and a threshold T ,
s.t. NLD(x, y) ≤ T . If |x| ≤ |y| then LD(x, y) ≤ ⌊ 2×T×|y|2−T ⌋.
If |x| > |y|, then LD(x, y) ≤ ⌊T×|y|1−T ⌋.
Lemma 9: Given two strings x, and y, and a threshold T ,
s.t. NLD(x, y) ≤ T . If |x| ≤ |y|, then ⌈(1− T )× |y|⌉ ≤ |x|.
Lemmas 7 and 8 establish a lower bound on the number of
segments per token. From lemma 7 any partition scheme is
usable. However, an even-partition scheme, where the differ-
ence between the shortest and longest generated segments is
at most one, reduces the space of string chunks.
Lemmas 8 and 9 establish a condition on the lengths of two
tokens to be compared. The length-condition ⌈(1−T )×|y|⌉ ≤
|x| ≤ |y| has to hold for a pair of tokens, x and y, such that one
of which is in Rt and the other is in P t, and NLD(x, y) ≤ T .
E. Filtering Candidate Pairs of Tokenized-String
When generating candidate pairs of tokenized strings, rely-
ing solely on Theorem 3 results in a large proportion of spu-
rious candidates, especially when the tokenized strings have
numerous tokens. TSJ applies two low-cost filters to effectively
prune the candidates before computing their NSLD.
1) Pruning based on Length: Based on lemma 6, TSJ
discards candidate pair of tokenized strings if their aggregate
token length ensures their NSLD distance exceeds the thresh-
old, T . The algorithm represents each tokenized string by a
unique identifier for efficiency. This identifier is augmented
with the length of the tokenized string to prune candidate pairs
of identifiers based on the lengths of the tokenized strings.
2) Pruning based on Distance Lower Bound: TSJ can
prune candidate pairs by computing a lower bound on the
NSLD of any candidate pair by establishing a lower bound
on the character-level edit operations for each token of the two
tokenized strings. To that end, TSJ augments each tokenized
string unique id with a histogram of its token lengths. Given
the pair of the token-length histograms of two tokenized
strings, and the lengths of the token pairs whose NLD is
below T , TSJ can compute lower bounds on SLD and NSLD
of the pair by computing a lower bound on the character-level
edit operations for all the pairs of tokens, whether matched or
unmatched. For the matched tokens, the character-level edit
operations are already computed during the candidate genera-
tion phase. For the unmatched tokens, TSJ computes a lower
bound based on the length histograms, and on Lemma 10.
Lemma 10: Given two strings x, and y, and a threshold T ,
s.t. NLD(x, y) > T . If |x| ≤ |y| then LD(x, y) > ⌊T×|y|2−T ⌋.
If |x| > |y|, then LD(x, y) > ⌊ 2×T×|y|2−T ⌋.
The pruning algorithm and the proof of its correctness will
be discussed in an extended version of the paper.
F. The Final Verification
Once the pruned candidates are found, the tokenized-string
identifiers are resolved to the tokenized strings, and the final
verification is carried by calculating its SLD as below. The
NSLD of any pair is trivially computed from its SLD.
SLD Calculation: Given two tokenized strings, xt, and yt,
let xt = {xt1, xt2, . . . , xtm} and yt = {yt1, yt2, . . . , ytn}.
Calculating SLD(xt, yt) entails forming a weighted bigraph
〈V,E,w〉. Let k = max(m,n). Auxiliary tokenized strings
xt′ = {xt1, xt2, . . . , xtk} and yt′ = {yt1, yt2, . . . , ytk} are
constructed, where extra tokens are empty strings. Let X be
a set of nodes that represents tokens in xt′ and Y be a set of
nodes that represents tokens in yt′. Define V = X ∪ Y , E =
{〈Xi, Yj〉|Xi ∈ X,Yj ∈ Y }, and edge weights w(〈Xi, Yj〉) =
LD(xti, ytj), ∀i, j. The minimum weight perfect matching on
this weighted bigraph is computed. This is a manifestation
of the assignment problem that can be solved using the
Hungarian algorithm. The time complexity for constructing the
weighted bigraph is O(L(xt)×L(yt)); and the time complex-
ity of the Hungarian algorithm is O(max(T (xt), T (yt))3).
So, the overall time complexity of calculating SLD(xt, yt) is
O(L(xt)× L(yt) +max(T (xt), T (yt))3).
G. Optimizations and Approximations
The section describes optimizations and approximations.
1) Self-Joins: The motivating application focuses on self-
join, i.e., R = P . Performing self-join allows for a major
optimization, skipping symmetric steps in the candidate gen-
eration and the pruning steps. When generating segments,
from lemma 8, the case where |x| ≤ |y| only needs to
be considered, yielding fewer segments. When generating
Similar-Token candidate pairs, applying the length-condition
does not need to consider the cases where x ∈ Rt, and y ∈ P t
as well as the cases where x ∈ P t, and y ∈ Rt, since P = R.
2) High-Frequency Tokens: Avoiding high-frequency to-
kens can enhance the quality of comparison results. In the
application of comparing full names described in Sec. I-A,
“John” and “Mary” are very common tokens, and may result
in uninteresting results. Both the Shared-Token and Similar-
Token candidate pair generation processes discard tokens that
are shared by more than a given maximum number of tok-
enized strings, M . Dropping high-frequency tokens achieves
better load balancing between the MapReduce workers.
Dropping high-frequency tokens in a scalable way will be
discussed in an extended version of the paper.
3) De-Duplicating by Grouping on One String: During
the evaluation of the NLD of tokens or the NSLD of the
tokenized strings, duplicate pairs arise. To avoid redundant
computation, duplicate candidate pairs are discarded using
a MapReduce job. There are two possible strategies. The
first one, grouping-on-both-strings is to use the MapReduce
shuffler to group together instances of the same pair, and make
the reducer output this pair exactly once. The second strategy,
grouping-on-one-string, forms a key-value tuple from each
pair, where the key is one string, and the value is the other
string. The reducer then de-duplicates the reduce value list
using a hash set. To balance the load among the reducers,
for every pair of strings, τ and υ, τ is used as the key
and υ is used as the value if and only if int(HASH(τ) <
HASH(υ)) = (HASH(τ)+HASH(υ))%2, where HASH
is a fingerprint function that hashes τ and υ to an integer.
Otherwise, υ becomes the key and τ becomes the value.
4) Exact-Token-Matching Approximation: When the thresh-
old, T , is small, and the tokens are relatively short, a pair of
similar tokenized strings tend to share a common token. Then,
the candidate-pair generation process can be reduced down to
the shared-token strategy. The expensive similar-token strategy
can be skipped with minor impact on the recall.
5) Greedy-Token-Aligning Approximation: This approxi-
mates the SLD(xt, yt) as follows. The edge weights of
the token bigraph are computed exactly. However, instead
of exactly computing the minimum weight perfect matching
using the Hungarian algorithm, a greedy approach is fol-
lowed. The greedy-token-aligning selects the edge with the
minimum LD weight, and removes the two corresponding
tokens from the bigraph nodes. This is repeated until all the
tokens have been matched. This reduces the time complexity
to O(L(xt)× L(yt) + T (xt)× T (yt) log (T (xt)× T (yt))).
IV. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
introduces a distance measure for tokenized strings that is
intuitive, metric, and whose join algorithm is scalable. The
previous work on tokenized-string similarity, distributed joins
of strings, and distributed fuzzy metric joins are reviewed.
The MGJoin algorithm [51] proposed joining tokenized
strings by representing each tokenized string as a bag of to-
kens. This work proposes a serial algorithm, and a MapReduce
extension that employ prefix-filtering [1], [11], [25], [52], [71]
and inverted indexes. The technique is very similar to [64],
but employs multiple global orders of the tokens. Distributed
prefix-filtering-based techniques were shown to be inefficient
in [45], as apparent from comparing the speedups against [64]
in both [51] and [45]. All these set-based techniques handle
token shuffles, but do not handle token edits.
In the context of answering K-nearest-neighbor queries for
data cleaning, Chaudhuri et al. introduced Fuzzy Matching
Similarity (FMS) [10]. The user sets penalties for token
insertion, deletion, or editing. While being able to handle both
token shuffles and edits, FMS had two main drawbacks. First,
it is provably not a metric. Second, FMS is sensitive to token
order. An approximation, AFMS, was introduced that ignores
the token positions. AFMS matches each token in a string
to its best matching token in the other string, which may
result in multiple tokens from one string matched to the same
token in the other string. Unfortunately, both FMS and AFMS
are not symmetric, which poses challenges when using them
as tokenized-string similarity measures in other applications.
Chaudhuri et al. proposed a serial FMS-based query algorithm,
FuzzyMatch, to identify the closest K tokenized strings given
a query, and devised enhancements for indexing, and caching.
Several tokenized-string comparison approaches are con-
trasted in [13] that focuses on joining names and records by
comparing string. Among the contrasted distance measures
are the Jaro-based distances [31], [69] that emerged from the
statistical communities and deals with names as non-tokenized
strings. To overcome the non-tokenization, and the set-based
distances drawbacks (no shuffles and no edits, respectively),
[13] introduced SoftTfIdf that computes the Jaccard index of
two-tokenized strings while considering the popularity of their
tokens. SofTfIdf allows for token edits, by allowing tokens
to match with up to some threshold on their Jaro-Winkler
(JW) distance. However, SoftTfIdf has multiple drawbacks.
The work in [13] does not describe an algorithm to compute
the distance. To compare two tokenized strings, two thresholds
have to be set by the user, T 1 on the JW distance between
tokens and another threshold, T 2, on the Jaccard similarity of
the tokenized strings. Two tokenized strings are considered
T 1-T 2-similar if their Jaccard similarity exceed T 2 given
that T 1 is used as the token matching threshold. Setting two
unrelated thresholds impairs the tuning of the join. SoftTfIdf
is non-metric, since JW violates the triangle inequality.
The work in [67] is a generalization and an improvement
over that in [13]. In addition to Jaccard, the work in [67] adapts
more set-based similarity measures [8], e.g., Dice, cosine, to
tokenized-string joins. Like SoftTfIdf [13], to compare two
tokenized strings, Wang et al. require a threshold, T 1 on
token similarity and another threshold, T 2, on tokenized-
string similarity. The algorithm matches two tokens from
the two token sets only if their token similarity exceed T 1.
The sum of the similarities of the matched tokens are then
used to compute the customized set-based similarity of the
two tokenized strings. Like [10], [13], the similarity measure
in [67] depends on two totally unrelated thresholds, which
impairs the tuning of the join. Like [10], [13], the proposed
tokenized-string measures are provably non-metric.
Wang et al. devised an effective candidate string-pair
pruning technique that works for the customized similarity
measures in [67], and is based on prefix-filtering. The custom
pruning proposed in [67] imposes limitations on adopting new
string-joining algorithms. Moreover, the algorithm is serial,
i.e., cannot scale out to multiple machines for scalability.
When compared to the existing tokenized-string distance
measures, the proposed NSLD is a metric, and naturally
uses the tokenized-string threshold, T , to prune non-similar
tokens (Theorem 3). The TSJ framework uses a state-of-the-
art distributed string-joining algorithms to perform the joins,
and can hence scale out virtually to any input dataset.
Several string-join algorithms have been proposed, as re-
cently surveyed in [73], and their performance was compared
in [9], [13], [26]. In our implementation, we used MassJoin
[19] for finding similar tokens. MassJoin is a distributed ver-
sion of Pass-Join [36], which employs a filter-and-verification
framework. In the filter step, Pass-Join generates signatures for
strings, such that two similar strings are guaranteed to share at
least one signature. This way, Pass-Join prunes pairs of strings
that are guaranteed to be dissimilar. The remaining candidate
pairs are verified in the verification step. Pass-Join was also
generalized such that two similar strings are guaranteed to
share K signatures, yielding the PassJoinK algorithm [38].
The PassJoinK was parallelized, yielding the PassJoinKMR
and PassJoinKMRS algorithms [38]. As noted in [73], the
MassJoin avoids shortcomings of its competitors by frugally
generating candidates, and employing light-weight filters.
Distributed joining in general metric spaces has been the
focus of [39], [53], [56], [68], most of which rediscover or
borrow ideas from the work in [30]. These efforts (recursively)
partition the data records into sub-partitions such that similar
records belong to the same partitions, or neighboring partitions
in the metric space. These techniques compare only two
partitions if their candidate records may yield a joined pair.
In theory, these techniques can be employed to compare
tokenized strings as well as tokens, since both NSLD and
NLD are metrics. However, in preliminary experiments, none
of these techniques ran to completion within reasonable time
when applied to NSLD-joins as detailed in Sec. V.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we report the results of several experiments
that evaluate the scalability and the accuracy of TSJ, and the
impact of the proposed optimizations and approximations.
The motivation for this work is detecting rings of accounts
using their tokenized strings signals. The experiments were
run on the names on Google accounts from a specific region.
The number of tokenized strings used is 44,382,766. The
names were tokenized using whitespaces and punctuation
characters. The tokenized strings were self-joined resulting in
1.9670× 1015 possible pairs.
The default parameters used for the evaluation runs are
as follows. The MapReduce jobs are run on 1,000 machines
(1,000 Mappers and 1,000 Reducers) running Ubuntu Linux.
Every machine is allowed only 1G of memory, 5G of disk,
and 0.5 cpu. The default thresholds on the pairwise NSLD
(T ), and on popular tokens occurring with multiple tokenized
Fig. 1. Comparing the runtime of Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ) while
varying the MapReduce machines and the Deduping algorithm.
strings (M ) assume the values 0.1 and 1,000, respectively5.
A. Scalability and Speedup
TSJ was run while varying the number of machines from
100 to 1,000. Both options for deduping the candidate pairs of
strings (grouping-on-one-string and grouping-on-both-strings)
were used, and the runtimes are plotted in Fig. 1. Both
deduping options scaled out well. Both achieved a speedup
of 3.8 as the number of machines increased by 10 folds.
Consistently, grouping-on-one-string was clearly faster than
grouping-on-both-strings, achieving a speedup between 13%
and 32%. This can be attributed to the overhead of instantiating
MapReduce workers. The grouping-on-one-string mechanism
instantiates a worker for each string, whose work is verifying
each of its potentially similar strings. Meanwhile, grouping-
on-both-strings instantiates a worker for each candidate pair
of strings, whose work is verifying only one pair of strings.
Notice that grouping-on-both-strings achieves better load
balancing. In case there exists a small set of strings, each
of which is potentially similar to numerous strings, all these
candidate pairs would be spread out among multiple workers,
which better distributes the load than grouping-on-one-string.
B. Joining by Approximate Matching
The effect of the approximations in Sec. III-G, greedy-
token-aligning and exact-token-matching, on runtime and ac-
curacy are reported.
1) Impact of Approximations on Speedup: All the exper-
iments below are run using grouping-on-one-string. While
fuzzy-token-matching produces the correct pairs of similar
tokenized strings, it has the longest runtime.
Fig. 2 shows the runtime while varying T from 0.025 to
0.225. The mean runtime saving of greedy-token-aligning over
fuzzy-token-matching is 13%, and is more pronounced as T
5These parameters may differ across geo-locations depending on the names
popularity. Typically, for each major geo-location, a gradient descent search
is performed to set these parameters. At each gradient descent evaluation, a
sample of the clusters is evaluated by the operations team of Google, and
the rates of true positives and the false positives are computed. The values of
0.1 and 1,000 constitute a reasonable starting point for the search. For this
dataset, setting M to 1,000 discarded roughly 1% of the tokens.
Fig. 2. Comparing the runtime of Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ) while
varying NSLD and the token matching and aligning algorithms.
Fig. 3. Comparing the runtime of Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ) while
varying max-frequency (M ) and the token matching and aligning algorithms.
increases. The mean runtime saving of exact-token-matching
over fuzzy-token-matching is 60%. Moreover, the runtime of
exact-token-matching increases only slightly as T increases.
Fig. 3 shows the runtime while varying M from 100 to
1,000. The mean runtime saving of greedy-token-aligning
over fuzzy-token-matching is 9%, while that of exact-token-
matching is 33%. The runtime savings of both approximation
schemes were fairly stable across the values of M .
Fig. 4. Comparing the number of pairs of Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ)
while varying NSLD and the token matching and aligning algorithms.
Fig. 5. Comparing the number of pairs of Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ)
while varying max-frequency (M ) and the token matching and aligning
algorithms.
2) Impact of Approximations on Accuracy: The proposed
approximations make TSJ err on the false negative side,
guaranteeing the precision (the percentage of the discovered
pairs that are truly similar) to be always 1.0. However, the
recall (the ratio between the number of the discovered pairs
to the number of pairs discovered by fuzzy-token-matching) is
not necessarily as perfect. To assess the impact of the proposed
approximations on the recall, the number of pairs of tokenized
strings that were found similar were reported while varying the
two main parameters, T and M . The numbers of similar pairs
are plotted in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively.
Fig. 4 shows the number of discovered pairs while varying
T from 0.025 to 0.225. The recall of greedy-token-aligning
(exact-token-matching) was 1.0 when T was 0.025 and de-
creased to 0.99993 (0.86655) as T reached 0.225.
Fig. 5 shows the number of discovered pairs while varying
M from 100 to 1,000. For all values ofM , the recall of greedy-
token-aligning was stable around 0.999999, and between 0.974
and 0.985 for exact-token-matching.
In the space of possible (T ,M ) thresholds, some deductions
could be made around the reasonable point of (0.1, 1,000)
from Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. First, the number of similar pairs of
tokenized strings increases more aggressively by increasing T
than by increasing M . Second, increasing T has more impact
on the recall of the approximations proposed in Sec. III-G than
M . Below we analyze why this is the case for each of the two
approximations in turn.
As T increases, there is more room for fuzzy-token-
matching to behave differently from greedy-token-aligning.
When aligning the tokens of any pair of tokenized strings,
at least a pair of aligned tokens has its NLD smaller than T
(Theorem 3). Hence, larger T translates to more ways to align
the tokens of the two tokenized strings, making greedy-token-
aligning finding the optimal alignment less likely.
On the contrary, an increase in M does not highlight the
difference between fuzzy-token-matching and greedy-token-
aligning. An increase in M merely increases the number of
tokens considered for generating candidate pairs of tokenized
strings, which does not impact the token aligning.
The increase in T leaves room for fuzzy-token-matching
to behave differently from exact-token-matching in generating
the candidate pairs of tokenized strings. For any pair of
tokenized strings to have their NSLD below the T , at least
two tokens have to exist, one from each tokenized string, such
that their NLD is below T (Theorem 3). For small T and
relatively short name strings, small NLD increases the chance
of an exact match between these two tokens, which makes
fuzzy-token-matching degenerate to exact-token-matching.
On the other hand, the increase in M highlights the
difference between fuzzy-token-matching and greedy-token-
aligning to a lesser degree. Any similar pair of tokenized
strings either share a token, or have a pair of tokens that
can be fuzzily matched together. In the first case, exact-
token-matching behave exactly like fuzzy-token-matching. In
the second case, only fuzzy-token-matching discovers such
candidate pairs. Since as M increases, the tokens that become
considered for discovering candidate pairs are popular, the first
case becomes more prevalent.
C. Lessons from Advertising Fraud Rings
The TSJ framework was very effective in catching fraud
rings. Using multiple string signals, TSJ allowed for discover-
ing several fraud rings that were not detectable previously.
Based on the evaluation above that was done on real full
names, we strongly recommend using greedy-token-aligning
for all values of T , and M . This results in almost no loss
in recall, and notable enhancement in the runtime. We also
recommend implementing grouping-on-one-string since it re-
sulted in improving the runtime for all the experiments.
Using exact-token-matching when T is set to a small or
a moderate value (between 0.025 and 0.1) results in very
minor loss in recall, with very significant improvement in the
runtime. However, It is worth noting that the exact-token-
matching approximation caught mainly the unsophisticated
attacks that had the least monetary impact. The more sophis-
ticated attacks were caught only by the fuzzy-token-matching
algorithm. Hence, we recommend this approximation only
for data integration and cleaning where missing some similar
records does not have a significant financial impact, and the
computational resources are scarce.
D. Comparing the Accuracy of the Distance Measures
The distances produced by NSLD and the state-of-the-art
distance measures are compared. The comparison was with the
weighted versions of the set-based fuzzy similarity measures,
FJaccard, FCosine, and FDice [67]. For all the set-based
fuzzy measures, the distance is taken as 1− similarity.
We could not evaluate the quality of the set-based fuzzy
similarity measures on our dataset, since the join algorithm
proposed in [67] is serial and does not scale to large-scale
datasets. However, we assessed how NSLD and the set-based
fuzzy measures can be used as proxies to assess if an account
is fraudulent or not. We have selected a sample of 10,000
accounts that have their names changed. Half the sample were
known legitimate accounts and the other half were known
Fig. 6. The ROC curves of NSLD, wighted FJaccard, weighted FCosine, and
weighted FDice when predicting fraudulent accounts based on the distance
between the old and new names on an account.
fraudulent accounts. The name changes on the legitimate
accounts happen in rare cases, such as legal name changes, or
name abbreviation, e.g., from “William” to “Bill”. On the
other hand, name changes on fraudulent accounts are usually
very drastic, since, attackers who specialize in account creation
are not those who specialize in account exploitation [60]. The
account-creation attacker typically chooses a random name.
When the credentials are sold to the attacker, the account name
is drastically changed. The NSLD and the set-based fuzzy
measures were used to measure the distance between the old
and the new account names. The ROC curves are in Fig. 6.
Assuming the correlation between the magnitude of the
name change and the likelihood of fraud, NSLD is superior
to all these set-based fuzzy measures when quantifying the
distances between names on accounts. The existing tokenized-
string measures assume the edits are mostly non-malicious and
are either manual typos or OCR errors. This assumption does
not apply when an adversary strives to game the measures.
E. Comparing TSJ with the State of the Art Join Algorithms
TSJ is the first distributed similarity-join algorithm for
tokenized strings. However, the existing distributed metric-
space join algorithms lend themselves to a comparison with
TSJ, since the proposed distance, NSLD, is a metric.
We compared TSJ to a state-of-the-art metric-space join
algorithm. The Hybrid Metric Joiner (HMJ) is an in-house-
built algorithm that is hybrid of the most scalable and efficient
algorithms [53], [68] proposed for metric-space joins and
reviewed in Sec. IV. As proposed in [53], the tokenized strings
are dissected into partitions among centroids by dissecting the
space among the centroids using Voronoi hyperplanes, and are
assigned to neighboring partitions using the general filter in
Fig. 7. Comparing the runtime of Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ) and the
Hybrid Metric Joiner (HMJ) while varying the MapReduce machines.
[53]. The symmetry of the distance metric was exploited to re-
duce comparing tokenized strings from neighboring partitions,
as proposed in [68]. Each partition is recursively repartitioned
either using sub-centroids as proposed in [68], or using a 2-
dimensional grid as proposed in [53], depending on how the
tokenized strings are scattered within the partition. Finally, the
computation is made more efficient by exploiting the triangle
inequality to output cliques and bicliques of tokenized strings
as described in [68]. TSJ and HMJ were run while varying
the number of machines from 100 to 1,000, and the runtimes
are plotted in Fig. 7. HMJ did not finish on 100 machines in a
reasonable amount of time. For all the other configs, TJS was
12 to 15 times faster than HMJ.
The metric-space techniques work best when the data is
fairly distributed in the space. However, when visualizing
the tokenized strings as multi-dimensional points in a metric
space, they form a large number of fairly dense clusters, due
to sharing tokens. This results in load imbalance between the
workers. TJS on the other hand transforms the join problem to
the token domain, performs a join using a very specialized and
scalable string-join algorithm, and uses the results to generate
candidate pairs of tokenized strings. Since most of the work
happens in the token domain, the poorly distributed tokenized
strings do not impact the performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Existing tokenized-string distance measures are sensitive to
the order of the tokens, asymmetric, or are hard to tune since
they require setting multiple independent thresholds. More-
over, their join algorithms are serial and hence unscalable.
In this paper, we motivated and introduced a novel distance
metric between tokenized strings, Normalized Setwise Lev-
enshtein Distance (NSLD). To the best of our knowledge,
NSLD is the first metric distance for tokenized strings.
Moreover,NSLD is the only distance measure that guarantees
carrying the distance threshold from the tokenized strings to
their tokens. This allows for transforming the join from the
tokenized-string domain to the tokens domain. The tokens do-
main is more manageable, since the number of distinct tokens
is typically orders of magnitude smaller than that of distinct
tokenized strings, and the literature of string-join algorithm is
richer. Based on this property, we propose a very specialized
and scalable framework, Tokenized-String Joiner (TSJ), which
adopts existing string-join algorithms as building blocks to
perform NSLD-based joins. The scalability of the proposed
framework, and the effectiveness and accuracy of the proposed
approximations are established by our evaluation on tens of
millions of names on Google accounts. We demonstrated the
superiority of NSLD over the state-of-the-art weighted set-
based fuzzy similarity measures in terms of accuracy, and
the superiority of the tokenized-string-specific TSJ over the
metric-spaces joins in terms of scalability and efficiency.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Since |y| ≥ |x|, and from Def. 2, NLD(x, y) = 2|x|+|y|
LD(x,y)
+1
, then |y| −
|x| ≤ LD(x, y) ≤ |y|.
B. Proof of Lemma 4
Trivially, SLD(xt, xt) = 0. Moreover, SLD(xt, yt) =
SLD(yt, xt)∀xt, yt. To prove the Triangle Inequality, let
xt = {xt1, xt2, . . . , xtm}, yt = {yt1, yt2, . . . , ytn}, and
zt = {zt1, zt2, . . . , zto}. Let k = max{m, n, o}. Construct three auxiliary
tokenized strings xt′ = {xt1, xt2, . . . , xtk}, yt′ = {yt1, yt2, . . . , ytk},
and zt′ = {zt1, zt2, . . . , ztk}, where extra tokens are empty strings.
Clearly, SLD(xt, yt) = SLD(xt′, yt′), SLD(yt, zt) = SLD(yt′, zt′),
and SLD(xt, zt) = SLD(xt′, zt′). There is a transforming
path for each token tuple xtxi → ytyi → ztzi ,∀i ∈ [1, k].
From the Triangle Inequality of LD(·, ·), it follows that
LD(xtxi , ytyi) + LD(ytyi , ztzi) ≥ LD(xtxi , ztzi). Summing on all k
tokens,
∑k
i LD(x
txi , ytyi)+
∑k
i LD(y
tyi , ztzi) ≥
∑k
i LD(x
txi , ztzi).
Hence, SLD(xt, yt) + SLD(yt, zt) ≥ SLD(xt, zt).
C. Proof of Lemma 5
Trivially, NSLD(xt, xt) = 0. In the other extreme, let xt only be empty.
L(xt) = 0. From Def. 3, SLD(xt, yt) = L(yt). Hence, NSLD(xt, yt) =
2×L(yt)
2×L(yt)
= 1.
D. Proof of Lemma 6
L(yt) ≥ L(xt) is assumed. From Def. 4, NSLD(xt, yt) =
2
L(xt)+L(yt)
SLD(xt,yt)
+1
. It follows that L(yt)− L(xt) ≤ SLD(xt, yt) ≤ L(yt).
E. Proof of Theorem 2
Trivially, NSLD(xt, xt) = 0. Moreover, NSLD(xt, yt) =
NSLD(yt, xt)∀xt, yt. To prove the Triangle Inequality, let xt =
{xt1, xt2, . . . , xtm}, yt = {yt1, yt2, . . . , ytn}, and similarly zt =
{zt1, zt2, . . . , zto}. we prove the case NSLD(xt, yt)+NSLD(yt, zt) ≥
NSLD(xt, zt).
Because of Lemma 5, if any of xt, yt, or zt are empty, the Triangle
Inequality is trivially satisfied. Thus, we consider the case where none of the
three tokenized strings are empty.
Again, because of Lemma 5, if NSLD(xt, yt) ≥ NSLD(xt, zt) or
NSLD(yt, zt) ≥ NSLD(xt, zt), then the Triangle Inequality is trivially
satisfied. Thus, we consider the case where NSLD(xt, zt) is greater than
both NSLD(yt, zt) and NSLD(xt, yt).
NSLD(xt, yt) < NSLD(xt, zt), and
NSLD(yt, zt) < NSLD(xt, zt). (1)
From Rel. 1, we further derive the following relations.
(
NSLD(xt, zt)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
−
NSLD(xt, yt)
2−NSLD(xt, yt)
)
> 0, and
(
NSLD(xt, zt)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
−
NSLD(yt, zt)
2−NSLD(yt, zt)
)
> 0. (2)
Lemma 4, the Triangle Inequality of SLD, gives the following relations.
SLD(xt, yt) + SLD(yt, zt) ≥ SLD(xt, zt) (3)
From Def. 4, we express SLD in terms of NSLD.
SLD(xt, yt) =
NSLD(xt, yt)
2−NSLD(xt, yt)
×
(
L(xt) + L(yt)
)
,
SLD(yt, zt) =
NSLD(yt, zt)
2−NSLD(yt, zt)
×
(
L(yt) + L(zt)
)
, and
SLD(xt, zt) =
NSLD(xt, zt)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
×
(
L(xt) + L(zt)
)
. (4)
Combining Relations 3 and 4, we get the following relations.
NSLD(xt, yt)
2−NSLD(xt, yt)
×
(
L(xt) + L(yt)
)
+
NSLD(yt, zt)
2−NSLD(yt, zt)
×
(
L(yt) + L(zt)
)
≥
NSLD(xt, zt)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
×
(
L(xt) + L(zt)
)
This can be rewritten as follows.
(
NSLD(xt, yt)
2−NSLD(xt, yt)
+
NSLD(yt, zt)
2−NSLD(yt, zt)
)
× L(yt) ≥
(
NSLD(xt, zt)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
−
NSLD(xt, yt)
2−NSLD(xt, yt)
)
×L(xt)+
(
NSLD(xt, zt)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
−
NSLD(yt, zt)
2−NSLD(yt, zt)
)
× L(zt) (5)
From both Lemmas 5 and 6, 1−
L(xt)
L(yt)
≤ NSLD(xt, yt)∀xt, yt. This
can be rewritten as the following two relations.
L(xt) ≥ (1−NSLD(xt, yt)) ×L(yt)∀xt, yt (6)
L(zt) ≥ (1−NSLD(yt, zt))× L(yt)∀yt, zt (7)
Putting together Relations 2, 5, 6, and 7 yields the following.
(
NSLD(xt, yt)
2−NSLD(xt, yt)
+
NSLD(yt, zt)
2−NSLD(yt, zt)
)
× L(yt) ≥
(
NSLD(xt, zt)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
−
NSLD(xt, yt)
2−NSLD(xt, yt)
)
× L(yt)×
(
1−NSLD(xt, yt)
)
+(
NSLD(xt, zt)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
−
NSLD(yt, zt)
2−NSLD(yt, zt)
)
× L(yt)×
(
1−NSLD(yt, zt)
)
(8)
Since L(yt) > 0, then Rel. 8 can be simplified as follows.
(
NSLD(xt, yt)
2−NSLD(xt, yt)
)
×
(
1 +
(
1−NSLD(xt, yt)
))
+
(
NSLD(yt, zt)
2−NSLD(yt, zt)
)
×
(
1 +
(
1−NSLD(yt, zt)
))
≥
(
NSLD(xt, zt)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
)
×
((
1−NSLD(xt, yt)
)
+
(
1−NSLD(yt, zt)
))
This can be further simplified as follows.
(
NSLD(xt, yt) +NSLD(yt, zt)
)
NSLD(xt, zt)
≥
2−
(
NSLD(xt, yt) +NSLD(yt, zt)
)
2−NSLD(xt, zt)
(9)
Rel. 9 implies NSLD(xt, yt) +NSLD(yt, zt) ≥ NSLD(xt, zt).
F. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is by contradiction. W.L.O.G, let NSLD(xt, yt) ≤ T ;
xt and yt has two tokens each, xt1, xt2 and yt1, yt2, respectively;
and to achieve minimum SLD, xti is transformed into yti, ∀i ∈
{1, 2}. Assuming NLD(xti, yti) > T , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, it follows that
2×LD(xti,yti)
|xti|+|yti|+LD(xti,yti)
> T , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. Let f1 = 2 × LD(xt1, yt1),
f2 = |xt1| + |yt1| + LD(xt1, yt1), f3 = 2 × LD(xt2, yt2), f4 =
|xt2| + |yt2| + LD(xt2, yt2). Hence, f1
f2
> T and f3
f4
> T . No-
tice that NSLD(xt, yt) = f1+f3
f2+f4
, and that the initial assumption was
NSLD(xt, yt) ≤ T , which contradicts f1
f2
> T and f3
f4
> T . The argument
is generalizable for any T (xt) and T (yt).
G. Proof of Lemma 8
From Def. 2,
2×LD(x,y)
|x|+|y|+LD(x,y)
≤ T , which implies LD(x, y) ≤
T×(|x|+|y|)
2−T
. If |x| ≤ |y|, substituting with the upper bound of |x|,
which is |y|, and taking the lower bound of the r.h.s. since LD(x, y)
is a whole number, yields LD(x, y) ≤ ⌊
2×T×|y|
2−T
⌋. If |x| > |y|, then
|x| ≤ LD(x, y) + |y|. Substituting with the upper bound of |x| in
Def. 2 yields
2×LD(x,y)
|y|+LD(x,y)+|y|+LD(x,y)
≤ T . This can be simplified to
LD(x, y) ≤ ⌊T×|y|
1−T
⌋.
H. Proof of Lemma 9
From Def. 2,
2×LD(x,y)
|x|+|y|+LD(x,y)
≤ T , which implies LD(x, y) ≤
T×(|x|+|y|)
2−T
. Substituting with the lower bound of LD(x, y), which is
|y| − |x|, yields |y| − |x| ≤
T×(|x|+|y|)
2−T
. This can be simplified as
2×|y|−2×|x| ≤ 2×T ×|y|, and further simplified as |y|×(1−T ) ≤ |x|.
Taking the upper bound of the l.h.s. since |x| has to be a whole number
establishes the relationship in the lemma.
I. Proof of Lemma 10
From Def. 2,
2×LD(x,y)
|x|+|y|+LD(x,y)
> T , which implies LD(x, y) >
T×(|x|+|y|)
2−T
. If |x| ≤ |y|, substituting with the lower bound of |x|, which is
0, and taking the lower bound of the r.h.s. since LD(x, y) is a whole number,
yields LD(x, y) > ⌊T×|y|
2−T
⌋. If |x| > |y|, substituting with the lower bound
of |x|, which is |y|, and taking the lower bound of the r.h.s. since LD(x, y)
is a whole number, yields LD(x, y) > ⌊
2×T×|y|
2−T
⌋.
